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As Tim Horder rightly opined in the Oxford Magazine 
(No 287, Noughth Week, TT, 2009), “Oxford and 
Cambridge are generally recognised as being world-
class universities. As such they set a gold standard for 
the entire UK university system.”1 Indeed, by all relevant 
criteria, Oxford is a paragon of academic research and 
teaching, which is why it is one of the top ten universi-
ties in the world, as identified by Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University’s Institute of Higher Education.2 However 
Oxford differs from all the other “top ten” universities 
in one significant regard – academic freedom is explic-
itly recognised in its Mission Statement, viz: “The most 
fundamental value, underpinning all of our scholarly 
activity, is academic freedom, defined as the freedom to 
conduct research, teach, speak and publish, subject to 
the norms and standards of scholarly inquiry, without 
interference or penalty, wherever the search for truth 
and understanding may lead.”3 To be scrupulously fair, 
Cambridge (the other UK “top ten” entrant) describes its 
core values as “freedom of thought and expression; free-
dom from discrimination”, but most scholars in the field 
of academic freedom would regard these as analogous 
to libertas philosophandi,4 and therefore broader than 
academic freedom.
As academic freedom is given such prominence within 
Oxford’s Mission Statement, it is surprising to read in 
the Oxford Magazine that there have been plans both to 
alter the system of university governance by increasing 
the number of external appointments to Council5 and 
to introduce a new contract which reduces the employ-
ment security of academic staff.6 Published research 
demonstrates that such developments are likely to have 
deleterious effects on academic freedom at Oxford. For 
example, with respect to governance, Brown’s survey of 
UK universities found that:
“if there is one common feature running through these reports 
it is the difficulty which these institutions had in control-
ling the behaviour of a strong chief executive who was often 
closely associated with a small group of key Governors who 
may have bypassed a largely supine Governing Body, many of 
whom were not sufficiently knowledgeable either about high-
er education matters or about their own rights and responsi-
bilities as members of the supreme decision making body of a 
higher education institution.”7
Similarly, Shattock found:
“little hard evidence that the new managerialism … has been 
particularly successful in delivering academic success”, 
and that:
“where improprieties and breakdowns have occurred, they 
have centred on governing bodies and the executive and not 
on the academic community. Indeed, in nearly all such cases 
… attention was drawn to the difficulties by concern in the 
academic community.”8
With respect to tenure, McPherson and Schapiro’s 
work revealed that:
“Faculty members with tenure will have more independ-
ence. Administrators need to rely more on persuasion and 
less on negative sanctions. ... Tenure increases the ability of 
faculty collectively to shape institutional decisions, through 
their actions in departments, colleges, or the institution as a 
whole,”9
while De George notes that:
“by giving a large number of the faculty tenure ... they are 
in a position to defend the academic freedom not only of 
themselves but of all the non-tenured members of the insti-
tution, as well as the academic freedom of faculty at other 
institutions.”10
In essence, the substantial body of research11 of which 
such findings are a part confirms that, as Gerber main-
tains, shared governance and tenured employment are 
“the two principal institutional bulwarks for academ-
ic freedom”12 and indicates that current proposals to 
change both the governance process and employment 
security at Oxford will contradict a cardinal tenet of the 
University’s Mission Statement with respect to academic 
freedom.
The battle over tenure in UK higher education is 
long lost, having been abolished by the 1988 Education 
Reform Act, which makes the need to retain faculty con-
trol of governance all the more important. In a previous 
edition of the Oxford Magazine, Nicholas Bamforth and 
Christopher Forsyth13 have demonstrated the limits to 
HEFCE’s legal powers with respect to trying to enforce 
its current preferences concerning the composition of 
Oxford’s Council. In considering the “wise response” 
to HEFCE advocated by Bamford and Forsyth, it may 
be useful to refer to the UK’s international responsibil-
ities to UNESCO and the UN. Acting on the UK gov-
ernment’s behalf, the Education Minister, Claire Short, 
signed the UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the 
Status of Higher Education Personnel in 1997. On the 
subject of self governance and collegiality, this docu-
ment states the following:
“Autonomy is the institutional form of academic freedom 
and a necessary precondition to guarantee the proper fulfil-
ment of the functions entrusted to higher-education teaching 
personnel and institutions. … Self-governance, collegiality 
and appropriate academic leadership are essential compo-
nents of meaningful autonomy for institutions of higher edu-
cation.14 Higher-education teaching personnel should have 
the right and opportunity, without discrimination of any 
kind, according to their abilities, to take part in the govern-
ing bodies and to criticize the functioning of higher education 
institutions, including their own, while respecting the right 
of other sections of the academic community to participate, 
and they should also have the right to elect a majority of rep-
resentatives to academic bodies within the higher education 
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institution.”15
With respect to employment security, the 
Recommendation states:
“Tenure or its functional equivalent, where applicable, 
should be safeguarded as far as possible even when changes 
in the organization of or within a higher education institution 
or system are made, and should be granted, after a reasonable 
period of probation, to those who meet stated objective cri-
teria in teaching, and/or scholarship, and/or research to the 
satisfaction of an academic body.”16
Leading universities such as Oxford are not just insti-
tutions for teaching and research; they are (inter alia) 
repositories and guardians of national language, litera-
ture and culture, and icons of the intellectual accom-
plishments of nation states. Consequently, it may be 
considered appropriate (if not obligatory), for Oxford 
to lead the way in ensuring that the UK government 
fulfils its responsibilities under the 1997 UNESCO 
Recommendation. Irrespective of whether it would 
be successful, an appeal to UNESCO’s Committee of 
Experts on the Application of the Recommendation 
concerning Teaching Personnel by Oxford (as have been 
made by institutions from Australia and Denmark), on 
the claim that the HEFCE requirements constitute an 
abrogation of the 1997 Recommendation, would give 
the UK government a substantial public relations prob-
lem, and also would highlight the fact that the UK is the 
worst country among the 27 EU states in upholding the 
1997 Recommendation.17
Furthermore, examination of the Committee of 
University Chairmen (CUC) documentation makes 
HEFCE’s insistence that Oxford follow the CUC’s 
governance guidelines all the more difficult to compre-
hend. For example, the original CUC Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI’s) Project Brief states “No part of the 
monitoring framework offered by the CUC was intend-
ed to be mandatory or prescriptive; in effect a menu of 
options was offered for institutions to draw upon in the 
light of their own mission, needs and circumstances.”18 
Echoing this sentiment, the 2006 CUC Report on the use 
of KPIs states: “Each indicator measures the quality that 
its designers are interested in and each governing body 
needs to decide for itself what measures are relevant 
and helpful in its specific situation.”19 There is insuffi-
cient space to examine in detail the scope and suitabil-
ity of KPIs to institutions like universities;20 however, 
it is worth noting that Kaplan and Norton, the origina-
tors of the “Balanced Scorecard”, one of the models to 
which the CUC refers, have stated that when the bal-
anced scorecard framework is adapted for non-profit 
organisations, “The Mission, rather than the finan-
cial/shareholder objectives, drives the organization’s 
strategy.”21 Given that academic freedom is central to 
Oxford’s Mission – which would be undermined by the 
governance KPIs proposed by HEFCE – it would seem 
appropriate, in line with the CUC’s advice, to acknowl-
edge that these KPIs are neither relevant nor helpful to 
Oxford.
In the July 2007 Report to Oxford, HEFCE’s 
Assurance Service stated that “the modern govern-
ance consensus across all sectors is that it is beneficial 
for the effectiveness of governing bodies ... and for the 
independent scrutiny of outside investors’ interests, 
that their membership should be largely non-executive, 
external and without conflicts of interests.”22 However, 
nowhere on the CUC website is there empirical evidence 
to either verify this statement or demonstrate how, and 
in what ways, putting external appointees in the major-
ity on governing bodies improves a university’s abilities 
to achieve excellence in teaching and research.
Clearly, if it is found that the best universities (as 
measured by, for instance, RAE performance, position 
in the Shanghai Jiao Tong rankings, etc.) have governing 
bodies largely populated by external appointments, then 
there may be some merit in benchmarking best practice 
and bringing the governing bodies across the HE sector 
in line with those of the best universities. It would seem 
appropriate to start the considerable research required 
to validate this strategy by undertaking a case study of 
the best university. Harvard has been classified the best 
university in the world in every Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University ranking since 2003, and is also ranked first 
in the current THE ranking. Harvard has two govern-
ing bodies, the Corporation and the Board of Overseers. 
The Corporation comprises seven members, three (all 
Harvard graduates) from the private sector, three from 
the public sector (two are Professors at other USA uni-
versities) and the President, all bar two of whom have 
Harvard degrees. The Board of Overseers has 30 mem-
bers, each elected by Harvard alumni for a six-year term. 
All the Board’s members have Harvard degrees, and ten 
work in other universities, eleven work elsewhere in the 
public sector (as ambassadors, judges, astronauts, etc) 
and nine have jobs in private companies.
As Areet relates “Harvard ... was closely modeled on 
Oxford and Cambridge with one significant difference: 
the governance system. Because there were not enough 
scholars in Massachusetts Bay Colony to reproduce 
the English system of faculty governance, the colonists 
established a lay (in the sense of nonfaculty) govern-
ing board.”23 Hence circumstances rather than choice 
forced Harvard to include external nominees. However, 
Charles Eliot, who served the longest term as President 
in Harvard’s history, was unequivocal in his condemna-
tion of the abuse of power by external appointees on gov-
erning bodies, and wrote: “In the institutions of higher 
education the board of trustees is the body on whose dis-
cretion, good feeling, and experience the securing of aca-
demic freedom now depends. There are boards which 
leave nothing to be desired in these respects; but there are 
also numerous boards that have everything to learn with 
regard to academic freedom. These barbarous boards 
exercise an arbitrary power of dismissal. … all too fre-
quently, both in state and endowed institutions, they fail 
to treat the members of the teaching staff with that high 
consideration to which their functions entitle them.”24 
Consequently, over time the university has seen fit to 
allow the governance system to evolve such that control 
lies in the hands of the Harvard alumni who, in their 
wisdom, both appoint from within their own ranks, 
and ensure that nominees from the business sector are 
in a minority. As a result, decision making at Harvard 
is probably too protracted a process for either the CUC 
or HEFCE. However, as the present Harvard University 
President Drew Gilpin Faust proclaimed in her installa-
tion speech, “A university is not about results in the next 
quarter . . . . It is about learning that molds a lifetime, 
learning that transmits the heritage of millennia; learn-
ing that shapes the future”,25 thus echoing Birnbaum’s 
belief that “The greatest danger to higher education may 
not be that decisions are made too slowly because of the 
drag of consultation, but that they are made too swiftly 
and without regard for institutional core values.”26
Continuing disagreements between universities and 
governments about the rationale for, limits to, and ben-
efits of, academic freedom have made it a contentious 
concept, with the result that, as Moens points out “aca-
demic freedom continues to be a commonly used but 
misunderstood concept … only a minority of academics 
bother to explain what the concept of academic freedom 
means to them or even know what the concept really 
is.”27 Moreover, historically, the concept has had less 
credence in England than in other European states. As 
Neave28 relates, universities in England were more con-
cerned with preserving institutional autonomy (hence 
the importance of the university charter) than individual 
academic freedom, which meant that the Humboldtian 
emphasis on Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit, which pro-
vided the rationale for research universities in many 
European states and the USA, was largely absent in the 
UK. Consequently, unlike the UK, many European states 
and the USA provide constitutional or legal protection 
for academic freedom, either explicitly (for example, the 
Greek Constitution explicitly mentions academic tenure) 
or via interpretation of the constitutional protection for 
freedom of speech (as in the USA). Nevertheless, writing 
in 1963, Lord Chorley, then the General Secretary of the 
AUT, remarked that “On the narrow front of court deci-
sions there is very little to be said on the subject, nor has 
much systematic attention been given to it on a political, 
sociological or even educational basis” and concluded 
that “On balance I think it is fair to say that academic 
freedom is enjoyed as fully in English universities as any-
where else in the world. British academic staff have very 
little to complain of.”29 However, the UK lacks a written 
constitution and although there is a clause in the 1988 
Education Reform Act concerning academic freedom, 
the Act had the purpose of removing tenure – “secur-
ing that the statutes of each qualifying (HE) institution 
include a provision enabling an appropriate body ... to 
dismiss any member of the academic staff by reason of 
redundancy” (para. 203) – rather than protecting aca-
demic freedom. Moreover, the last Statutory Instrument 
(No. 604) which confirmed the powers and duties of 
the UK University Commissioners under the 1988 Act 
to protect academic freedom until 1st April 1996, was 
issued in 1995, and none have been issued since.
Whether or not Chorley’s qualitative appraisal was 
accurate at the time is a moot point. However, it cannot 
be denied that the legal and constitutional protection for 
academic freedom in the UK at present is the weakest in 
the EU. Examining constitutional and legislative protec-
tion for academic freedom, along with legal regulations 
concerning institutional governance, the appointment 
of the Rector and the existence of academic tenure, in 
order to create a composite picture of the health of aca-
demic freedom in all EU universities, my own research 
concluded that “in terms of the health of academic free-
dom, the UK is clearly the sick man of Europe.”30 In 
Finland, for example, freedom of speech and academic 
freedom are protected by the constitution and in legisla-
tion; the system of governance ensures that the academic 
staff have a majority voice in institutional decision mak-
ing; the Rector is an elected, internal appointment; and 
academic tenure is protected. By contrast, in the UK, 
no constitutional protection exists for either freedom 
of speech or academic freedom; the clause on academic 
freedom in the 1988 Act is designed to ensure ‘just cause’ 
for employment termination; in most universities the 
academic staff have only a minor input in the decision-
making process; the VC is an external appointment to 
which they have negligible input; and academic tenure 
exists for only a few staff, most of whom are close to 
retirement.
Management innovations like the governance pro-
posals advocated by the CUC and HEFCE exhibit the 
characteristics that led Allen and Chaffee to define 
them as fads, namely they are: borrowed from another 
context without being fully adapted to the new setting; 
applied without careful consideration of their limita-
tions; presented as overly complex or deceptively simple, 
and depend on jargon.31 Assessing the life cycles of such 
fads in higher education, Birnbaum concluded that “If 
the success of management fads over the past 40 years is 
measured by the extent to which they have been adopted 
and maintained in recognizable form in a reasonable 
number of institutions of higher education, it can it be 
said with confidence that these innovations have uni-
formly failed.”32 Neave rightly laments that UK univer-
sities “have a dangerous faith in management models, 
often developed in organisational settings other than the 
university and no less in their capacity to act as a ‘quick 
fix’. The lesson … must surely be, ‘There ain’t no quick 
fix.’”33
Last year Peter Pulzer wrote in Oxford Magazine 
about “The Day Oxford Grew Up”,34 and recalled the 
refusal by Congregation to award an honorary doctor-
ate to the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. He 
observed that “If De Montfort University had decided 
to snub Mrs Thatcher then no-one would have taken a 
blind bit of notice. Because it was Oxford, the event tells 
us something significant about British academic poli-
tics”. Further, he rightly noted that “opposition was not 
just a moan about Oxford, … but a general protest on 
behalf of both the tertiary and the secondary sectors” 
and concluded “What has changed is that we are now 
grown up and being grown up means confidence in the 
worth of what we do in the face of those who have no 
confidence in us”. Academic freedom, which is already in 
a parlous state in UK higher education, is a defining hall-
mark of the intellectual climate and institutional culture 
at Oxford University, and accounts for its pre-eminence 
within both the UK and globally. Acceding to HEFCE’s 
requirements regarding governance procedures will ulti-
mately compromise academic freedom at Oxford, and if 
academic freedom cannot flourish at a university such as 
Oxford, then surely it will not survive at institutions like 
De Montfort. Being grown up imposes responsibilities, 
not only to one’s self, but also on behalf of others who 
may be less fortunate.
[Terence Karran will be visiting Oxford at the invitation of 
the Oxford Student Higher Education Research Group for 
its meeting on 1st December, 2009, which will be address-
ing the concept of “academic freedom”. Further details 
about the meeting can be obtained from Andrew Boggs 
(andrew.m.boggs@gmail.com)]
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